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Abstract 
 
Using an international sample of firms from 25 countries and a country-level index for societal 
trust, we document that societal trust is negatively associated with tax avoidance, even after 
controlling for other institutional determinants, such as home country legal institutions and tax 
system characteristics. We explore the effects of two country-level institutional characteristics—
strength of legal institutions and capital market pressure—on the relation between societal trust 
and tax avoidance. We find that the relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced 
when the legal institutions in a country are stronger and is more pronounced when the capital 
market pressure is stronger. Finally, we examine the relation between societal trust and tax evasion, 
an extreme and illegal form of tax avoidance. We show that societal trust is negatively related to 
tax evasion and the negative relation is less pronounced when legal institutions are stronger. 
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strength of legal institutions and capital market pressure—on the relation between societal trust 
and tax avoidance. We find that the relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced 
when legal institutions in a country are stronger and is more pronounced when capital market 
pressure is stronger. Finally, we examine the relation between societal trust and tax evasion, an 
extreme and illegal form of tax avoidance. We show that societal trust is negatively related to tax 
evasion and the negative relation is less pronounced when legal institutions are stronger. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent revelations in the “Panama Papers” and “Paradise Papers” of alleged tax evasion by 
individuals and corporations call into question the effectiveness of formal tax laws and rules in 
constraining corporate tax avoidance. Opportunities for firms to avoid tax arise because of the 
intricacies of tax codes and the difficulty of tax enforcement. Therefore additional rules and 
regulations imposed to curb tax avoidance are likely to be limited in effectiveness. In this study, 
we explore whether societal trust, an informal institution, helps constrain corporate tax avoidance. 
In particular, we examine the relationship between societal trust and corporate tax avoidance for a 
sample of firms from 25 countries. We build on research that indicates that social norms influence 
tax compliance by individual taxpayers (e.g., Winzel 2004, 2005; Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008). 
We reason that societal trust is salient for corporate tax avoidance because the costs of violating 
social norms increase with the level of trust. 
Arrow (1974) stresses the role of trust as the foundation in every economic transaction. 
Research examines the effects of societal trust on both financial and social outcomes. For example, 
the literature documents a positive relationship between societal trust and levels of economic 
growth and social efficiency (Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Knack and Zak 2001), 
international trade and investment (Guiso et al. 2009), financial development (Guiso et al. 2004, 
2008), corporate financing, and mergers and acquisitions (Duarte et al. 2012; Ahern et al. 2015). 
In sum, there is a well-established literature supporting the notion that trust underlies a wide array 
of economic exchanges.    
  In this study, we posit that the level of societal trust in a country is negatively related to 
corporate tax avoidance. According to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), tax avoidance represents “a 
continuum of tax planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one 
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end (lower explicit tax, perfectly legal)” and “terms such as ‘noncompliance,’ ‘evasion,’ 
‘aggressiveness,’ and ‘sheltering’ would be closer to the other end of the continuum.” We are 
interested in the more aggressive forms of tax planning that exploit the ambiguities and loopholes 
in the tax system by adhering to the letter but not the spirit and intention of tax laws.1  
Societal trust is a particularly critical and salient factor, given that the intricacies of tax 
codes and the difficulty of tax enforcement present many opportunities for firms to avoid tax. 
Firms do not always have an explicit and contractual obligation to pay their fair share of taxes. 
However, in societies with greater societal trust, managers may refrain from taking measures to 
dodge taxes to avoid breaking the social contract and being shunned by society for violating social 
norms (Hechter and Opp 2001; Horne 2009; Liu et al. 2014).2 Alternatively, if the costs for 
breaking the social contract are relatively low and managers take a narrower view of stakeholder 
welfare, they may aggressively avoid taxes to increase firm value for their shareholders. Therefore 
whether societal trust in a country is negatively related to corporate tax avoidance is an empirical 
question. 
We examine the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance in a large sample of 
162,467 firm-year observations across 25 countries spanning the years 1995 to 2014. Following 
prior studies (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Guiso et al. 2008; Pevzner et al. 2015; Kanagaretnam et 
al. 2017), we measure a country’s level of societal trust by its citizens’ average response to the 
following question in the World Values Surveys (WVS): “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We follow 
                                                 
1 Examples of aggressive tax planning include taking the more favorable tax position where the tax law is ambiguous 
or open to interpretation, structuring complex transactions where the only motivation for the transaction is tax savings, 
and other tax sheltering transactions, such as lease-in, lease-out, and contingent-payment installment sales. We refer 
to these forms of aggressive tax planning as “tax avoidance” in the rest of this paper. 
2 An example of such punishments includes being labeled as a “poor corporate citizen” (Bankman 2004), which might 
hurt product market outcomes (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Hardeck and Hertl 2014). 
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prior research (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012; Kanagaretnam et al. 2016) and measure tax avoidance as 
the difference between the firm’s “unmanaged tax amount” (the home-country statutory corporate 
tax rate times pre-tax earnings before exceptional items) and its “managed tax amount” (current 
taxes paid). This difference reflects the extent to which managers pursue strategies that reduce 
taxes paid. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find strong evidence that societal trust is negatively 
associated with corporate tax avoidance. This relation is also economically significant. When we 
include an extensive set of home country institutional characteristics as control variables in the 
regression specification, a one standard deviation increase in societal trust is associated with an 
8.9% decrease in tax avoidance. This result suggests that higher levels of societal trust could play 
a significant role in mitigating tax avoidance over and above the effects of formal institutions, 
such as home country tax system characteristics, which are designed to constrain tax avoidance. 
Research (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012) documents that corporate tax avoidance is lower in 
countries with higher-quality institutional characteristics, such as legal tradition, strength of 
investor rights, and ownership concentration. Because trust is a part of culture and does not exist 
in a vacuum, we also explore the interactions between societal trust and formal institutions and 
their joint relationship with tax avoidance. We consider two country-level institutional 
characteristics—strength of legal institutions and capital market pressure. We predict that the 
negative relation between societal trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the legal 
institutions are stronger and more pronounced when the capital market pressure is stronger. We 
find results consistent with these expectations. 
In additional analyses, we find that societal trust and trust in the government complement 
each other in reducing corporate tax avoidance. We also find that the negative association between 
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societal trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced for firms with multinational operations, whose 
tax planning activities of the entire business entity are likely to be less influenced by the norms of 
the country where the firm’s headquarters are located. We subject our main results to a battery of 
sensitivity tests, including using an instrumental variable approach to mitigate potential omitted 
correlated variable concerns, using two alternative measures of tax avoidance, and accounting for 
over-representation of U.S. and Japanese firms in the sample. Our inferences are robust to these 
additional tests. 
Our focus so far has been on the association between societal trust and corporate tax 
avoidance. In a supplementary analysis, we examine whether societal trust is associated with tax 
evasion, an extreme and illegal form of tax avoidance. This analysis is based on a novel dataset 
from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys that includes a measure of tax evasion. Whereas an 
advantage of this dataset is that it provides a more direct measure of tax evasion, a disadvantage 
is that it includes mostly smaller, private firms from less developed countries. Nevertheless, we 
find results that are consistent with our primary findings for tax avoidance; that is, societal trust is 
significantly negatively associated with tax evasion, and this relation is less pronounced when 
legal institutions are stronger. 
Our study makes several important contributions. First, our findings should matter to tax 
policymakers, who, concerned about declining corporate tax revenues, have proposed regulations 
such as tightening tax loopholes and increasing tax enforcement (Shulman 2009; DOT 2011; 
Hufbauer 2011; Keener 2011). Our study is particularly timely in light of the recent Panama 
Papers’ and Paradise Papers’ revelations, which allege money laundering, sanctions dodging, and 
tax avoidance by prominent individuals and corporations. These controversies have led to calls for 
an increase in tax regulation and enforcement to clamp down on avoidance. Our findings suggest 
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that the relationship between enforcement and tax avoidance is nuanced and that informal 
institutions such as societal trust act as a substitute for these formal institutions in mitigating 
incentives for tax avoidance. In other words, tightening of regulations may be needed more in 
countries with lower levels of societal trust. 
Second, our study illuminates the “under-sheltering puzzle.” Weisbach (2002) questions 
why firms do not use tax shelters or engage in tax avoidance more extensively, given the 
opportunity to save taxes at a relatively low economic cost and low probability of being challenged. 
He posits that firms’ inclination to avoid taxes could be a function of behavioral norms, where the 
sanctions for sheltering are reputational or social (p. 245). We provide evidence that societal trust 
potentially is one reason why firms do not pursue tax avoidance more aggressively.  
Third, our study contributes to the literature investigating cross-country determinants of 
tax avoidance. Atwood et al. (2012) find that tax avoidance across countries is associated with 
formal institutions, required book-tax conformity, and tax systems that use a worldwide versus a 
territorial approach. We extend this line of research by showing that an informal institution such 
as societal trust also relates to tax avoidance and is particularly important when formal institutions 
are weak. 
 Our study is subject to certain limitations. We mitigate concerns that our results are driven 
by an omitted or unobserved correlated variable by including an extensive set of country-level and 
firm-level controls as well as using an instrumental variable approach; however, we acknowledge 
that our results might be driven by some other omitted social or behavioral trait that is correlated 
with our measure of societal trust. Our findings should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.  
 The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related research and 
develop our predictions on the relation between societal trust and corporate tax avoidance and on 
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how this relation may vary across different institutional settings. We describe the measures of our 
main variables of interest and the research design in Section 3. We discuss the main results in 
Section 4 and the results of additional analyses and robustness checks in Section 5. We present the 
results relating societal trust and tax evasion in Section 6 and provide our conclusions in Section 
7. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
A culture of trust, which combines a willingness to trust with an associated disposition for 
trustworthiness (or reciprocity), can be useful in facilitating mutually beneficial exchanges in the 
presence of market imperfections, that is, when there is asymmetric information between 
transacting parties, when complete contracts cannot be written, enforced, or both and when perfect 
monitoring is prohibitively costly (Arrow 1974). Specifically, individuals who trust and are 
trustworthy can credibly commit to behave consistent with the spirit of contract, even when their 
behavior may not advance their best self-interest. For the commitment mechanism arising from a 
culture of trust to be effective in facilitating exchange, however, the individuals must largely agree 
on which behaviors are consistent with the spirit of the contract, in addition to being trusting and 
trustworthy. Neu (1991) highlights that trust is based on common expectations that form the 
essential starting point for interaction and exchange and embedded within these expectations are 
“hypothetical rules of conduct, norms of fairness and appropriate responses to unfair behavior.” 
We reason that corporate tax avoidance is a setting in which societal trust is likely to play 
an important role. The payment of corporate taxes can be viewed as an implicit social contract in 
which corporate taxpayers pay taxes to fund public spending and social welfare (Christensen and 
Murphy 2004). However, tax codes are complex, highly technical, and subject to alternative 
interpretations. In addition, a tax code is an incomplete contract that does not clearly articulate 
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what the taxpayer must do in every circumstance (Dowling 2014). As a result, there is substantial 
scope for tax avoidance activities that exploit the ambiguities and loopholes in the tax system.  
Given that trust and reciprocity are critical factors in economic activity in the presence of 
market imperfections (Arrow 1974), we expect societal trust to play an important informal 
monitoring role in mitigating tax avoidance. In high-trust societies, managers will largely agree 
that tax avoidance is inconsistent with the spirit of the tax code and hence are less likely to engage 
in the practice (Winzel 2004, 2005). In addition, managers in high-trust societies are more likely 
to reciprocate the trust that society places in them and are more sensitive to fairness considerations 
and maintenance of social ties and hence are less likely to intentionally avoid taxes.  
Although firms do not always have an explicit and contractual obligation to pay their fair 
share of taxes to society at large, managers will refrain from being tax aggressive to avoid breaking 
the implicit social contract and being shunned by society for violating social norms (Hechter and 
Opp 2001; Horne 2009; Liu et al. 2014). However, control mechanisms and punishments may not 
be the only reasons why individuals adhere to social norms. According to Kohlberg and Hersh 
(1977), individuals evolve in their moral development in three progressive stages: pre-
conventional, conventional, and principled levels. Individuals who have advanced to the principled 
level define moral values apart from the legal authority and may view tax avoidance as morally 
wrong, even if it is deemed legal. Torgler (2003) provides evidence that trust has positive influence 
on tax morale, even after controlling for a range of other individual characteristics. Furthermore, 
stakeholder theory suggests that firms may still want to behave fairly because they care about their 
reputation and the implicit claims between them and their stakeholders (e.g., Bowen et al. 1995; 
Greenwood and Van Buren III 2010).3  
                                                 
3 Evidence suggests that there are reputational costs associated with tax avoidance (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; 
Graham et al. 2013; Hardeck and Hertl 2014).  
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Based on the discussion above, we posit the following (in alternate form): 
H1:  Societal trust is negatively related to a firm’s tax avoidance.  
 
The reasoning in some papers (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Atwood et al. 2012) suggests the 
opposite prediction. This literature considers corporate tax avoidance as not necessarily implying 
that firms are behaving improperly, because managing tax costs is viewed as a necessary and 
appropriate component of a firm’s long-term strategy. Under this narrower view, in countries with 
higher levels of trust, shareholders trust managers to increase firm value through tax planning 
activities, and hence managers are more likely to reciprocate and engage in tax avoidance. Given 
these conflicting predictions, whether societal trust negatively relates to corporate tax avoidance 
is an empirical question. 
Because corporate tax avoidance may be impacted by the institutional environment 
(Atwood et al. 2012) and because societal trust, as a part of the culture, does not exist in a vacuum, 
we also explore the interactions between societal trust and formal institutions and their joint 
relationship with tax avoidance. Studies on trust (e.g., Williamson 1993; Guiso et al. 2004; Carlin 
et al. 2009; Aghion et al. 2010) document that trust and formal institutions are substitutes. The 
financial reporting literature documents similar findings. For example, Pevzner et al. (2015) find 
that the relation between trust and market reaction to corporate earnings announcements is weaker 
when investor protection is stronger. In light of these findings, we expect a substitutive relation 
between trust and formal institutions and therefore predict that the relation between trust and tax 
avoidance is less pronounced when country-level legal institutions are stronger. When legal 
institutions are stronger, there is less scope for aggressive tax avoidance because the legal 
framework and expectations are better established, more clearly defined, and more reliably 
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enforced. Therefore trust is likely to play a less important role in constraining tax avoidance when 
country-level legal institutions are stronger. 
The relation between societal trust and tax avoidance is also likely to depend on capital 
market pressure to increase firm value through tax planning. In countries with higher capital 
market pressure, managers may have more pressure to report higher earnings and avoid missing 
earnings benchmarks (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002; Graham et al. 2005). Managers have greater 
incentives to be aggressive in tax planning, so as to report higher after-tax income. As a 
consequence, there is greater scope for societal trust to thwart tax avoidance when managers’ 
incentives for tax avoidance are heightened. Hence we expect trust to play a more important role 
in constraining tax avoidance when country-level capital market pressure is stronger. 
Based on the above reasoning, we posit the following (in alternate form): 
H2a: The negative relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the 
country-level legal institutions are stronger. 
 
H2b: The negative relation between trust and tax avoidance is more pronounced when the 
country-level capital market pressure is stronger. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Measure of societal trust 
Following prior literature (e.g., Guiso et al. 2008; Ahern et al. 2015; Pevzner et al. 2015; 
Kanagaretnam et al. 2017), we construct our measure of societal trust based on responses to the 
following question from Wave 4 and Wave 5 of the World Values Survey: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?” The two possible answers are “Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be too careful.” 
We code the response to this question as one if a survey participant reports that most people can 
be trusted and zero otherwise. We then use the mean response for each country-year as our measure 
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of societal trust (TRUST). Higher values of TRUST correspond to higher societal trust. Research 
shows that aggregate levels of this trust measure correlate well across countries with several 
indicators of the level of trustworthiness, such as the level of corruption (Uslaner 2002) and the 
prevalence of violent crime (Lederman et al. 2002). 
As noted by Guiso et al. (2010), an individual’s response to this question captures her level 
of generalized trust, that is, trust toward generic members of the population in her own country. 
Given that corporations are run by individuals, we use this measure, which is based on individuals’ 
responses, as a proxy for mutual trust between firms and individuals within a country (Pevzner et 
al. 2015).  
3.2 Measure of tax avoidance 
Following Atwood et al. (2012), we measure tax avoidance as the reduction in the explicit taxes 
paid. We would like to use an empirical construct of tax avoidance that closely matches and 
corresponds to our theoretical construct of aggressive tax planning, but in an international setting, 
there is no widely accepted measure of tax aggressiveness in the literature. The results of recent 
studies that examine whether low tax rates empirically measure tax aggressiveness are mixed. For 
instance, recent studies use tax reserves for uncertain tax benefits disclosed under FIN 48 as a 
proxy for tax uncertainty and investigate whether low tax rates are associated with higher tax 
reserves. Dyreng et al. (2017) find that low cash effective tax rates are associated with significantly 
higher tax reserves, while Guenther et al. (2016) conclude that low cash effective tax rates are not 
associated with higher tax reserves based on a different research methodology. We also are 
constrained in our choice of empirical measures for aggressive tax planning such as DTAX (Frank 
et al. 2009), tax shelter prediction score (Wilson 2009), unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) prediction 
score (Rego and Wilson 2012), and tax reserves for uncertain tax benefits (Dyreng et al. 2017), 
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because many of the variables required to compute these measures are either not available or not 
applicable to non-U.S. settings. 
We follow Atwood et al. (2012) and measure tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) for firm i in year 
t as the difference between the tax on pre-tax income, computed at the home-country statutory 
corporate tax rate, and the taxes actually paid, expressed as a percentage of pre-tax income: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 =
[∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋 × 𝜏)𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡]
𝑡
𝑡−2
𝑡
𝑡−2
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑡
𝑡−2
,                                                                       (1) 
where PTEBX is pre-tax income less special items,  is home-country statutory corporate tax rate, 
and CTP is current taxes paid.4 We compute this measure using a three-year window because this 
period is adequate to reduce the effects of accruals that reverse in just one year. Following Atwood 
et al. (2012), we require the denominator in (1) to be positive; hence our sample includes only 
firms that have a cumulative profit in the three-year window. This measure of tax avoidance 
indicates the amount of taxes that the firm could avoid (“managed tax amount”), relative to the 
amount of taxes it is supposed to pay based on the home-country statutory tax rate (“unmanaged 
tax amount”). 
 We recognize that our measure of tax avoidance encompasses a broad spectrum of tax 
planning activities that are perfectly legal as well as activities that result from interpretations that 
can be characterized as gray areas. This may suggest that our measure may not capture aggressive 
tax planning very well, and hence firms exhibiting high tax avoidance based on this measure may 
not necessarily be viewed as violating social norms. We argue that our empirical measure can 
effectively capture aggressive tax planning that regulators, the media, and other stakeholders are 
                                                 
4 Atwood et al. (2012) define PTEBX as pre-tax earnings before exceptional items (data item 57 from the Legacy 
Global Compustat database) instead of pre-tax income less special items (PI minus SPI from the new Global 
Compustat database). Because the former variable is only available up to 2007, we modify the Atwood et al. measure 
of PTEBX so as to extend our sample period to 2014. Our results are robust to using the Atwood et al. measure of 
PTEBX and ending our sample period in 2007.    
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concerned about for the following reasons. First, the media (e.g., The Wall Street Journal) and 
other lobbying groups (e.g., Citizens for Tax Justice) identify tax avoiders as firms that report low 
actual tax payment rates. Second, Wilson (2009) documents that tax shelter participants exhibit 
lower tax rates, after engaging in tax sheltering, and that government agencies may view low tax 
rates as indicating tax sheltering (e.g., DOT 1999). This evidence suggests that low tax rates are 
widely viewed as aggressive tax planning, and hence firms that exhibit high tax avoidance, based 
on this measure, may actually be viewed as violating social norms, which is consistent with the 
theoretical construct of tax avoidance that we are trying to capture.5 
3.3 Empirical models—main analyses 
We estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression to test H1: 
TAXAVOIDit = α + βTRUSTit + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit,               (2) 
where TAXAVOID is the measure of tax avoidance, TRUST is the measure of societal trust, 
CONTROLS is a vector of firm-level and country-level controls, and YEAR_FE and IND_FE are 
indicator variables for year and industry, respectively.6 Because we test our hypothesis on a pooled 
sample, we cluster the standard errors by firm and include time- and industry-fixed effects in our 
regressions. The appendix includes the detailed definitions of all the variables. Based on H1, we 
expect higher societal trust to be associated with lower tax avoidance, and hence we expect β to 
be negative. 
We select CONTROLS that are factors documented by prior literature to be associated with 
tax avoidance (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012; Kanagaretnam et al. 2016). The first set of controls 
                                                 
5 We also note that, if our operational measure of tax avoidance is not very effective in capturing more aggressive tax 
planning, it will reduce the power of our tests and bias against finding results consistent with our hypothesis. Moreover, 
we attempt to control for benign tax planning, such as research and development tax credits and interest deductibility 
of debt, by including research and development intensity and leverage ratio as controls. 
6 We define industries using the classification in Frankel et al. (2002).  
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includes country-level variables (LEGFACTOR, STMCAP, WW, BTAXC, TAXRATE, TAXCOMP, 
VARCOMP, EARNVOL, FDI, GDPGR, and TREND). We also control for the strength of the 
country’s legal institutions (LEGFACTOR), using the first principal component from the factor 
analysis of the country’s legal tradition (common law versus code law), strength of investor rights, 
and ownership concentration as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). We control for the country’s 
capital market development using the size of the equity market (STMCAP), which we define as the 
stock market capitalization divided by GDP. In addition, we control for the following 
characteristics of the country’s tax system: 1) whether the tax system follows a worldwide or 
territorial approach (WW), 2) the required book-tax conformity (BTAXC), and 3) the statutory tax 
rate (TAXRATE). Atwood et al. (2012) find that these characteristics are associated with firms’ 
incentives to avoid taxes.7 We also control for tax compliance costs (TAXCOMP) because studies 
document that these costs are significant (e.g., Tran-Nam et al. 2000; Marcuss et al. 2013) and 
hence may influence a firm’s tax avoidance. 
We include the country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of total 
compensation (VARCOMP) because the literature suggests that managerial compensation 
incentives relate to tax avoidance (Atwood et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 2012).8 We include 
country-level earnings volatility (EARNVOL) as a control because Atwood et al. (2010) report that 
BTAXC is positively correlated with the cross-sectional variance in pre-tax income, and hence it is 
important to include this control variable to ensure that the effect of BTAXC on tax avoidance is 
                                                 
7 We hand collect each country’s annual statutory corporate tax rate and whether the tax system is worldwide or 
territorial from various sources, such as Ernst and Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, KPMG’s Corporate and 
Indirect Tax Rate Survey, PwC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries, and PwC’s “Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in 
the OECD” report. 
8 Atwood et al. (2012) use the country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of management compensation 
from Towers Perrin (2005), which reports the pay components of CEOs across 26 countries. We do not have access 
to data from the Towers Perrin’s report. Instead, we obtain equity-based compensation data from Bryan et al. (2010) 
who provide average equity-based compensation for 43 countries. The use of this variable also explains the differences 
in the countries represented in our sample of 25 countries and the Atwood et al. (2012) sample of 22 countries. 
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not overstated due to cross-country differences in earnings volatility. We control for the extent of 
outward direct foreign investments in a country (FDI) because direct investments in foreign 
jurisdictions may afford opportunities to transfer earnings or shift income across different tax 
jurisdictions. Finally, we control for economic growth using the GDP growth rate (GDPGR), 
which may influence tax avoidance across countries, and a time trend variable (TREND) to account 
for a time-series trend in corporate tax avoidance.  
A second set of controls includes firm-level variables that are documented to be associated 
with tax avoidance. We control for firm performance using pre-tax return on assets (PROA) 
because better-performing firms have greater scope to save taxes. We control for firm size (SIZE) 
because larger firms have more resources for tax planning. Conversely, better performing and 
larger firms may avoid aggressive tax planning to mitigate political scrutiny for not paying their 
fair share of taxes. We control for tax planning opportunities, such as research and development 
tax credits and deductibility of interest on debt, using research and development intensity (R&D) 
and leverage ratio (LEV), respectively. We control for annual sales growth (GROWTH) because 
firms with higher growth opportunities derive greater marginal benefits from saving cash taxes 
and hence have stronger motivation to avoid tax (Goh et al. 2016). We also control for auditor 
quality using an indicator variable (BIGN) that equals one if the firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor 
and zero otherwise, because high-quality auditors influence corporate tax avoidance 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2016). Finally, we control for various components of accruals such as current 
accruals, noncurrent accruals, and financial accruals (WC, NCO, and FIN, respectively) 
because the literature documents a positive association between tax avoidance and accruals (Frank 
et al. 2009).  
We note that, by including an extensive set of country-level and firm-level controls, we 
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mitigate concerns that our results could be driven by omitted or unobserved correlated variables. 
On the other hand, some of the control variables might subsume the effects of trust and thus bias 
against rejection of our null hypothesis. For instance, if trust facilitates growth in legal institutions, 
then our control for strength of legal institutions (LEGFACTOR) will include the effects of trust 
on tax avoidance. Consequently, the incremental effect of trust that we document provides a 
conservative estimate of the relationship between trust and tax avoidance. 
3.4 Empirical models—cross-sectional analyses 
To test H2, we augment equation (2) by adding the conditioning variable Conditioning_VAR and 
its interaction with TRUST and estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
TAXAVOIDit = α + βTRUSTit + ηTRUSTit × Conditioning_VARit + γConditioning_VARit  
+ ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit.                                 (3) 
In H2a, we examine the moderating effect of legal institutions on the relation between 
societal trust and corporate tax avoidance. Our measure of the strength of legal institutions in a 
country (LEGFACTOR) is the first principal component from a factor analysis of the country’s 
legal tradition (common law versus code law), strength of investor rights, and ownership 
concentration, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). The strength of legal institutions increases 
with LEGFACTOR, which also is included as a control variable in equation (2). We expect that 
societal trust and legal institutions are substitutes in constraining tax avoidance and therefore the 
relation between trust and tax avoidance will be less pronounced when legal institutions are 
stronger. Hence, based on H2a, we expect η in equation (3) to be positive. 
 In H2b, we examine the moderating effect of capital market pressure on the relation 
between societal trust and corporate tax avoidance. We expect capital market pressure, which we 
proxy by the relative size of the stock market, to be stronger when the equity market is more 
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important in a country. Accordingly, we measure capital market pressure (STMCAP) as the stock 
market capitalization divided by GDP in a country. We compute an annual measure of STMCAP 
using the data reported by Beck et al. (2009) and include it as a control variable in equation (2). 
We expect societal trust to play a more prominent role when capital market pressure is stronger. 
Hence, based on H2b, we expect η in equation (3) to be negative. 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample 
We construct our measures of tax avoidance and other firm-level control variables with data 
obtained for the 1995–2014 period from the Compustat Global database. We identify 35 countries 
with data available for computing these firm-level variables. We construct our main variable of 
interest, TRUST, based on individual responses to the World Values Surveys. The surveys were 
conducted and completed in six waves: 1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2004, 2005–
2008, and 2010–2014. We use the surveys in Wave 4 and Wave 5 of the WVS because they provide 
coverage of most of the countries in our initial sample and overlap with most of our sample period. 
Then we match the most recent available TRUST measure to our firm-year level variables. We 
remove seven countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and Portugal) that 
do not have data for computing the societal trust measure. We either hand collect the country-level 
institutional variables (e.g., statutory tax rates, classification of worldwide or territorial tax system) 
or obtain them from the data published by other authors (e.g., strength of investors’ rights and 
ownership concentration from La Porta et al. 1998, stock market capitalization index from Beck 
et al. 2009). We remove three countries (China, India, and Russia) for which the institutional 
variables are not available. Our final sample thus includes 25 countries. The number of countries 
represented is comparable to those of prior studies (e.g., 22 countries in Atwood et al. 2012 and 
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25 countries in Pevzner et al. 2015). We also trim each continuous firm-level variable at the 1% 
and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of extreme values. Depending on the availability of data, the 
final sample size used in the regression analyses ranges from 81,412 to 162,467 firm-year 
observations for the 20-year sample period. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the sample composition and the mean characteristics for each of the 25 countries. 
The sample size for each country ranges widely from 654 firm-year observations for Peru to 45,940 
firm-year observations for the United States. Our main test variable is TRUST. As observed in 
Table 1, which is ordered from low to high level of trust, societal trust varies widely across 
countries. Citizens in the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden) have the highest levels of 
trust in other people (about 60% or more of the respondents think that most people can be trusted), 
while citizens in Brazil, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey exhibit the lowest (less than 10% of the 
respondents think that most people can be trusted).  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of and correlations between the regression variables 
for the full sample. As observed from Table 2 Panel A, the mean (median) percentage of taxes 
avoided from pre-tax income (TAXAVOID) is 13.6% (12.8%), which, based on the mean (median) 
statutory corporate tax rate (TAXRATE) of 35.0% (38.4%), implies that the mean (median) firm in 
our sample paid a tax rate of 21.4% (25.6%). The mean (median) value of societal trust (TRUST) 
is 0.360 (0.391), which is comparable to that reported by Pevzner et al. (2015).  
Table 2 Panel B reports Pearson correlations between the variables in our analyses. As 
predicted by H1, we observe a significant negative correlation between societal trust (TRUST) and 
tax avoidance (TAXAVOID). Because these are pairwise univariate correlations, we defer our 
inferences to the multivariate tests reported in the following section. 
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4.3 Main analyses—Test of H1 and H2 
In this section, we present the test results for the primary hypotheses, which are reported in Table 
3. In Column 1, we test H1, which examines the association between societal trust and tax 
avoidance. We find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on TRUST, which is 
consistent with our prediction in H1. The negative relation between societal trust and tax avoidance 
also is economically significant. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in societal trust is 
associated with an 8.9% decrease in tax avoidance.9 In terms of economic magnitude, this 
translates to a decrease of 1.2% in taxes avoided from pre-tax income for an average firm that 
reports a mean TAXAVOID of 13.6%. In terms of dollar magnitude, the average cumulative three-
year pre-tax income in our sample is U.S. $677 million. This indicates that, for an average firm in 
our sample, a one standard deviation increase in societal trust is associated with a decrease in taxes 
avoided over a three-year period of U.S. $8.1 million. 
 Next, we explore two cross-sectional variations in the relation between societal trust and 
tax avoidance and test our predictions jointly in the same regression specification. In H2a, we 
examine the moderating role of legal institutions. We expect societal trust to play a less important 
role in countries with stronger legal institutions. We present the results of our test in Table 3, 
Column 2, where we use the legal institutional factor (LEGFACTOR) as a proxy for the strength 
of legal institutions in the country. Consistent with our prediction in H2a, we find that the 
coefficient of TRUST*LEGFACTOR is positive and significant, which indicates that the negative 
association between societal trust and tax avoidance is attenuated in countries with stronger legal 
institutions. These results are consistent with legal institutions and societal trust acting as substitute 
                                                 
9 The impact of a one standard deviation increase in societal trust (TRUST) on tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) is computed 
as -0.105 (coefficient on TRUST in Table 3) × 0.115 (the sample standard deviation of TRUST in Table 2) ÷ 0.136 
(the sample mean of TAXAVOID in Table 2) = 8.9%.   
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mechanisms in constraining tax avoidance. In addition, the coefficient of LEGFACTOR is negative 
and significant, which confirms that tax avoidance is lower in countries with stronger legal 
institutions. 
 In H2b, we examine how capital market pressure affects the relation between societal trust 
and tax avoidance. We predict that societal trust plays a greater role in constraining tax avoidance 
when the capital market pressure in the country is higher. We present the results of our test in 
Table 3, Column 2, where we use the size of the equity market (STMCAP) as a proxy for capital 
market pressure. Consistent with our prediction in H2b, we find that the coefficient of 
TRUST*STMCAP is negative and significant, which indicates that the negative association 
between societal trust and tax avoidance is accentuated in countries with higher levels of capital 
market pressure. In addition, the coefficient of STMCAP is positive and significant, which is 
consistent with our conjecture that capital market pressure creates incentives for firms to avoid 
taxes. 
 The signs of the coefficients of the control variables are largely consistent with our 
expectations. Similar to Atwood et al. (2012), we find that tax system characteristics, such as 
having a worldwide approach to taxing foreign income (WW) and a higher required book-tax 
conformity (BTAXC), are associated with lower tax avoidance. We also find that firms in countries 
with higher statutory tax rates (TAXRATE), higher tax compliance costs (TAXCOMP), higher 
variable compensation (VARCOMP), lower earnings volatility (EARNVOL), lower outward 
foreign direct investments (FDI), and stronger economic development (GDPGR) avoid more taxes 
and that there is an increasing trend (TREND) in tax avoidance over time. Turning to the other 
firm-level control variables, we find that better-performing firms (PROA) are associated with 
higher tax avoidance, presumably because they have greater scope to save taxes, and larger firms 
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(SIZE) avoid less taxes, possibly due to closer political scrutiny. We also find that firms with higher 
leverage (LEV) and higher sales growth (GROWTH) are associated with higher tax avoidance, 
consistent with greater opportunities to avoid taxes for firms with more debt and greater marginal 
benefits of avoiding taxes for growth firms. Lastly, consistent with the work of Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2016), we find that firms audited by Big N auditors (BIGN) avoid less taxes, and the accrual 
components (∆WC, ∆NCO, and ∆FIN) are associated with higher tax avoidance, which is 
consistent with a positive association between aggressive financial and tax reporting (Frank et al. 
2009). 
 We conduct additional robustness checks to mitigate potential concerns about sample 
representation. As indicated in Table 1, a significant portion of our firm-year observations 
comprises firms from the United States and Japan. To mitigate the concern that our results are 
driven by observations from these two countries, we re-estimate the models using two alternative 
research designs. First, we exclude observations of firms from both countries. Second, we employ 
a weighted least squares (WLS) approach so that each of the 25 countries receives equal weight in 
the regression estimations (Dittmar et al. 2003). In untabulated analyses of these two alternative 
specifications, we still find consistent evidence to support our earlier tests of H1 and H2. These 
results provide assurance that our primary findings are not driven by sample over-representation 
from the United States and Japan. 
 Overall, the results indicate that societal trust is negatively associated with tax avoidance, 
which is consistent with firms and managers responding to social norms and expectations when 
conducting their corporate tax planning. In addition, we find that the relation between trust and tax 
avoidance is less pronounced when the legal institutions are stronger and more pronounced when 
the capital market pressure is stronger. 
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4.4 Corroborating evidence 
In this section, we conduct additional cross-sectional analyses to corroborate the findings of our 
main hypothesis H1 and to provide further insights into the relation between societal trust and tax 
avoidance. First, we investigate whether individuals’ trust in the government moderates the 
association between societal trust and tax avoidance. If individuals’ trust in the government reflects 
the strength of social norms about the spirit (rather than the letter) of the tax law and about what 
constitutes a fair assessment of tax under the prevailing laws, then they are more likely to view tax 
avoidance as contradicting the spirit of the law and hence to engage in less aggressive tax planning. 
Accordingly, we expect trust in the government to complement societal trust and to therefore 
accentuate the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance. Conversely, trust in the 
government and societal trust also could be substitutes. In particular, when individuals trust 
managers more and government less to allocate funds for more productive uses for the benefit of 
society, they would prefer managers to avoid tax and deploy these savings more productively. 
Under these conditions, we expect trust in the government to substitute for societal trust and 
therefore to attenuate the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance. 
To examine these competing predictions, we construct a measure of trust in the government 
(TRUST_GOVT) from the responses to the following WVS question: “Do you have a lot of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, no confidence at all in the 
following: Government.” We then test our prediction by repeating our analyses after adding 
TRUST_GOVT and its interaction with societal trust (TRUST) to the model. As reported in Table 
4, Column 1, we find that the negative association between societal trust and tax avoidance is more 
pronounced when individuals trust government more. We also find that individuals’ trust in the 
government (TRUST_GOVT) is significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance. Overall, 
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these results are consistent with our main prediction that societal trust and trust in the government 
complement each other in reducing corporate tax avoidance. 
Next, we examine the effects of trust for a sample of multinational firms. We argued earlier 
that managers in high-trust societies respond to social norms in their home country and hence are 
less likely to avoid tax. For firms with extensive multinational operations in other jurisdictions, 
the tax planning activities of the entire business entity are likely to be less influenced by the norms 
of the country where the firm is headquartered, particularly if the leadership within the firm spans 
many nationalities across different foreign subsidiaries. Therefore we expect the relation between 
societal trust and tax avoidance to be attenuated for multinationals. Following Atwood et al. 
(2012), we use the payment/refund of foreign income taxes as a proxy for the presence of 
multinational operations.10 We then test our prediction by repeating our analyses after adding the 
presence of multinational operations (MULTI) and its interaction with societal trust (TRUST) to 
the model. As reported in Table 4, Column 2, we find that the negative association between societal 
trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced for multinationals. We also find a significantly negative 
association between tax avoidance and the presence of multinational operations (MULTI), 
consistent with the work of Atwood et al. (2012). Overall, these results support our prediction that 
the association between societal trust and tax avoidance is attenuated for firms with multinational 
operations. 
5. Additional analyses and sensitivity checks 
5.1 Instrumental variable (2SLS) estimation 
We recognize that, like most studies of this type, ours may suffer from omitted variable problems 
because it is difficult to control for all possible variables that could affect the formation and 
                                                 
10 Data on foreign income taxes (data item 51 from the Legacy Global Compustat) is only available to 2007. 
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accumulation of trust. If the omitted variable is also associated with tax avoidance, then our 
documented results on the association between societal trust and tax avoidance will be biased. Our 
cross-sectional analyses mitigate this concern because it is arguably harder for an omitted 
correlated variable to explain both our main and our cross-sectional findings. Also, in all our cross-
sectional analyses, we include additional controls for country-level formal institutional variables, 
such as legal institutions, and thus it is more difficult to find an omitted latent institutional variable 
that explains both country-level societal trust and tax avoidance in our analyses. Nevertheless, we 
attempt to address potential omitted correlated variable concerns by employing instrumental 
variable estimation.  
 The instrument we use is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization in a country because ethnicity 
and diversity are invariant for a country over long periods and hence more likely to be exogenous 
(e.g., Guiso et al. 2006). Leigh (2006) argues that ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels 
of trust because diverse communities find it more challenging to enforce a system of social norms 
and hence are less likely to trust one another. Therefore we expect higher ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization to be associated with lower levels of societal trust. We obtain information on each 
country’s ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ETHNIC) from Mauro (1995). 
We report the results of the first-stage regression in Table 5, Column 1. Consistent with 
our expectations, ETHNIC is significantly negatively associated with TRUST.11 We then use the 
predicted value of TRUST from the first-stage regression as our instrument in the second stage and 
test our predictions in H1 and H2. We present these results in Table 5, Columns 2 and 3, 
respectively. The results reported in Column 2 show that the predicted value of trust 
                                                 
11 As suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we formally test the strength of our instrumental variable by 
computing the partial F-statistic for the instrument used in the first-stage regression. The partial F-statistic is 7,736.27, 
much higher than the minimum benchmark of 8.96 for a model with one instrument, as reported by Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010). Therefore we conclude that our model does not suffer from a weak instrument problem. 
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(PRED_TRUST) is significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance, which is consistent with 
the results of the earlier test of H1. The positive and significant coefficient on 
PRED_TRUST*LEGFACTOR and the negative and significant coefficient on 
PRED_TRUST*STMCAP in Column 3 also corroborate the results of our earlier tests of H2a and 
H2b, respectively. Overall, the results from the instrumental variable approach indicate that our 
main results still hold after controlling for potential correlated omitted variables problems. 
5.2 Alternative measures of tax avoidance 
We also test the robustness of our results to using two alternative measures of corporate tax 
avoidance. There is a potential concern that TAXAVOID may not reflect and adequately control 
for different tax planning opportunities that vary across different industries and years. For the first 
alternative measure (TAXAVOID_ALT1), we define tax avoidance as an industry-year, mean-
adjusted tax avoidance measure, that is, the firm’s TAXAVOID minus the firm’s industry-year 
mean TAXAVOID. For the second measure, we attempt to capture more aggressive tax planning 
activities by using an indicator variable with a value of one for firms whose tax avoidance measure 
is in the top quartile of the sample distribution and zero otherwise (TAXAVOID_ALT2). The results 
of the analyses using these two alternative measures are reported in Table 6, Columns 1 and 2 for 
TAXAVOID_ALT1 and Columns 3 and 4 for TAXAVOID_ALT2. 
 As shown in Table 6, Columns 1 and 2, we continue to find that societal trust is 
significantly negatively associated with the industry-year, mean-adjusted tax avoidance measure 
(TAXAVOID_ALT1) and that this association is significantly weaker in countries with stronger 
legal institutions and stronger (but insignificant) in countries with higher capital market pressure. 
In Columns 3 and 4, we also find a significant negative association between societal trust and the 
likelihood of being tax aggressive (TAXAVOID_ALT2); this association is significantly weaker in 
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countries with stronger legal institutions and significantly stronger in countries with higher capital 
market pressure. Overall, the results indicate that our main tests of H1 and H2 are robust to using 
these two alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
6. Societal trust and corporate tax evasion 
We have investigated the association between societal trust and tax avoidance using a measure that 
captures a broad spectrum of tax avoidance activities, ranging from those that would be considered 
prudent and legal (i.e., exploiting ambiguity and unintended loopholes in the tax laws) to those 
that would be considered abusive or illegal tax sheltering (i.e., tax evasion). Legal tax planning 
may be better constrained by societal trust and social norms, whereas illegal tax evasion, which 
clearly violates social norms, may be more effectively disciplined by the legal and regulatory 
systems. If so, societal trust may not play a direct role in constraining tax evasion. As an extension 
of our study and to provide additional evidence on whether societal trust also constrains illegal tax 
evasion, we use a more direct measure of tax evasion and examine whether societal trust is 
associated with this measure. We discuss our tax evasion measure, describe the research design 
and sample, and present the results in the following sub-sections. 
6.1 Measure of tax evasion 
Following Beck et al. (2014) and Williams (2015), we obtain data on firm-level tax evasion from 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The measure of tax evasion is based on responses to the 
following question: “Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with 
taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment 
in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?” The tax evasion ratio (EVADE_RATIO) is equal 
to 100 minus the answered number, which indicates the percentage of revenue undeclared to the 
authorities for tax assessment. 
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 Note that the question on tax evasion in the survey is worded in an indirect way to elicit 
more honest answers because respondents might not admit wrongdoing in a non-anonymous 
survey. As a result, there may be concerns that answers do not reflect the actual extent of tax 
evasion committed by a respondent’s own firm. Beck et al. (2014), who also use the responses to 
this survey question as a proxy for firm-level tax evasion, discuss several reasons why 
measurement error is not likely to invalidate the proxy’s use. First, they point out that “managers 
presumably most often respond based on their experiences,” and hence researchers can cautiously 
use these indirect survey responses as reflecting managers’ own behavior. Second, Beck et al. 
(2014) argue that, if respondents answered this question based only on their observations of what 
others are doing, there would not be significant within-country-industry variation in the measure 
of tax evasion because respondents would answer the question based on industry averages, rather 
than their own behavior. Their data exhibits significant within-country industry variation in this 
indirect survey measure of tax evasion, which suggests that respondents are indeed answering 
based on their own behavior. Third, the authors find a high correlation between this measure of 
tax evasion and the ratio of informal activity to GDP, which suggests that the measure is capturing 
the extent of tax evasion among different firms in the country. Fourth, the World Bank is cognizant 
of the sensitivity of these types of questions, and hence government officials are neither directly 
involved with data collection nor are they given any raw data to help them identify the individual 
respondents. This is to elicit truthful responses to these sensitive survey questions. In light of the 
above reasons, we use the indirect survey responses as a proxy for tax evasion; however, we 
caution that the results of this tax evasion analysis should be interpreted with this limitation in 
mind. 
6.2 Research design and sample 
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Similar to the main analyses, we use the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
EVADE_RATIOit = α + βTRUSTit + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit,        (4) 
where EVADE_RATIO is the measure of tax evasion, TRUST is the measure of societal trust, 
CONTROLS is a vector of firm-level and country-level controls, and YEAR_FE and IND_FE are 
indicator variables for year and industry, respectively. The appendix includes the detailed 
definitions of all the variables. 
 Because the World Bank Enterprise Surveys do not collect the same firm-level financial 
variables as we have used in the tax avoidance analysis, we cannot use the same empirical 
specification as before. Furthermore, because this dataset does not provide the names of the firms, 
we are limited to use of only the variables included in the dataset in our empirical specification. 
Following Williams (2015), we include the following control variables collected from the World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys: 1) strength of legal institutions in the country, proxied by business 
regulation quality (REGQUALITY); 2) tax rate (TAX_RATE); 3) tax administration difficulty 
(TAX_ADMIN); 4) whether the firm’s financial statements are reviewed by an external auditor 
(AUDIT); 5) percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors (FOREIGN); 6) percentage of sales 
that are exported directly (EXPORT); 7) age of the firm (AGE); 8) total number of employees 
(EMPLOY); 9) informal payment as a percentage of sales (INF_PMT); 10) extent of local 
corruption (CORRUPT); 11) whether the firm is located in a small city (SMALL_CITY); 12) 
whether the firm is located in the capital city (CAPITAL_CITY); 13) total amount of taxes paid by 
businesses (TAXPMT); and 14) growth in GDP (GDPGR). 
 Our initial sample of firms for the period 2002–2006 is obtained from the standardized 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys, which cover both private and public firms of all sizes and 
ownership types from 26 different industries across 98 countries. After merging this dataset with 
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our TRUST variable and obtaining the necessary control variables, we obtain a sample of 24,617 
firm-year observations from 47 countries (see Table 7). The sample size from each country ranges 
from 74 for Burkina Faso to 1,631 for Turkey. As observed from this table, the sample countries 
in this tax evasion analysis based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys are predominantly small 
private firms from developing countries, whereas the sample countries in the tax avoidance 
analysis based on Compustat Global are large public firms from more developed countries (see 
Table 1).12 According to the World Bank, the purpose of its Enterprise Surveys is to “better 
understand conditions in the local investment climate and how they affect firm-level productivity,” 
and “the goal is to advise government on ways to change policies that hinder private 
establishments.” Hence it is not surprising that the respondents of the surveys are mostly smaller 
firms from developing countries that are likely to face greater obstacles to enterprise operation and 
growth. Hence the results of this tax evasion analysis should be interpreted in light of the sample 
composition differences from the tax avoidance sample. 
6.3 Results 
We present the estimation results of the association between societal trust and tax evasion in Table 
8. Consistent with the results of the tax avoidance analyses (H1), we find in Column 1 that societal 
trust is negatively associated with tax evasion. The relation between societal trust and tax evasion 
is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in TRUST is associated with a 
5.0% decrease in tax evasion.13 In addition, the coefficient of the legal institution variable 
                                                 
12 Of the 25 countries covered in the tax avoidance analysis in Table 1, only 10 countries are covered in the tax evasion 
analysis in Table 7 (Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Spain, and 
Turkey). 
13 The impact of a one standard deviation increase in societal trust (TRUST) on tax evasion (EVADE_RATIO) in 
Column 1 is computed as -8.735 (coefficient on TRUST in Table 8) × 0.108 (the sample standard deviation of TRUST, 
untabulated) ÷ 18.861 (the sample mean of EVADE_RATIO, untabulated) = 5.0%.  
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(REGQUALITY) is negative and significant, indicating that tax evasion is lower in countries with 
stronger legal institutions.  
 We also examine whether the strength of legal institutions and societal trust act as 
substitutes in constraining tax evasion. Consistent with the results of the tax avoidance analyses 
(H2a), we find, in Column 2, that the negative association between societal trust and tax evasion 
is less pronounced in countries with stronger legal institutions. Overall, the results in this section 
suggest that societal trust is associated with lower tax evasion and this association is weaker when 
the country’s legal institutions are stronger.14 
 
7. Conclusion 
Societal trust is an important facet of a country’s culture, and the literature finds that trust affects 
a broad spectrum of social and economic outcomes. We extend this emerging line of research by 
examining whether the level of trust in a society relates to corporate tax avoidance. We predict 
that, in societies with higher levels of trust, managers will conform more closely to social norms 
and refrain from actions that may betray the trust that society places in them and pay a fair share 
of corporate taxes. Therefore we expect societal trust to be negatively associated with tax 
avoidance. 
Using a large sample of firm-year observations from 25 countries, we find robust evidence 
of a negative relation between societal trust and tax avoidance, even after controlling for the effects 
of formal institutions, such as tax system characteristics that have been documented to be effective 
in constraining tax avoidance. In additional analyses, we find that societal trust and formal 
institutions, such as legal institutions, act as substitutes in constraining tax avoidance. That is, the 
                                                 
14 We do not examine the moderating role of capital market pressure (H2b) because the sample firms are predominantly 
private firms that do not face capital market pressures to evade taxes.  
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negative association between societal trust and tax avoidance is less salient when legal institutions 
in the country are stronger. We also find that societal trust plays a more important role in damping 
the incentives to avoid tax when capital market pressure is stronger. Our inferences are robust to a 
number of sensitivity tests, including using an instrumental variable approach to mitigate potential 
omitted correlated variable concerns, using two alternative measures of tax avoidance, and 
accounting for sample over-representation of countries. 
In a supplementary analysis, we examine whether societal trust is associated with tax 
evasion, measured using a novel dataset from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Consistent with 
the results for tax avoidance, we find that societal trust also is significantly negatively associated 
with tax evasion and this relation is less pronounced when legal institutions are stronger. 
We make several important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the body 
of research that investigates cross-country determinants of corporate tax avoidance by showing 
that informal institutions, such as societal trust, also relate to tax avoidance, after controlling for 
the variables that have been shown to affect tax avoidance. Second, we extend the growing 
literature on the financial and tax reporting implications of societal trust. We contribute to this line 
of research by showing that societal trust is associated with firms’ tax reporting decisions. Third, 
our study is relevant to tax policymakers concerned about declining corporate tax revenues and 
the increasing gap between reported earnings and taxable income. Our findings suggest that 
societal trust acts as a substitute for formal institutions in mitigating corporate tax avoidance.  
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 APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables used in the Tax Avoidance Analysis 
TRUST = Societal trust index, based on responses to the WVS question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?” The two possible answers were 
“Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be too careful.” We recode the 
response to this question to one if a survey participant reports that most 
people can be trusted and zero otherwise. We then calculate the mean of the 
response for each country-year. Higher values correspond to higher societal 
trust. 
PRED_TRUST = The predicted value of TRUST from the first-stage regression, where ethnic 
fractionalization (ETHNIC) is used as the instrumental variable. 
TAXAVOID = Measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
[∑ (𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋×𝜏)𝑖𝑡−∑ 𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡]
𝑡
𝑡−2
𝑡
𝑡−2
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑡
𝑡−2
, 
where PTEBX is pre-tax income less special items,  is home-country 
statutory corporate tax rate, and CTP is current taxes paid. The extent of tax 
avoidance is increasing in this measure. 
TAXAVOID_ALT1 = Industry-year mean-adjusted measure of tax avoidance, computed as the 
firm’s TAXAVOID minus the firm’s industry-year mean TAXAVOID. The 
extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure.   
TAXAVOID_ALT2 = An indicator variable that equals one if TAXAVOID (defined above) is within 
the top quartile of the sample distribution and zero otherwise. 
LEGFACTOR = Institutional factor used by Atwood et al. (2012). It is the first principal 
component from the factor analysis of the country’s legal tradition (common 
law versus code law), strength of investor rights, and ownership 
concentration as reported by La Porta et al. (1998) 
STMCAP = Annual stock market capitalization divided by GDP from Beck et al. (2009). 
WW = Indicator variable that equals one if the home-country adopts a worldwide 
tax system and zero if the home-country adopts a territorial tax system. 
BTAXC = Proxy for the level of required book-tax conformity, following Atwood et al. 
(2010). BTAXC is computed based on the conditional variance of current tax 
expense from the following model, estimated by country-year: 
𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, 
where CTE is current tax expense, PTBI is pre-tax book income, DIV is total 
dividends, and all variables are scaled by average total assets. BTAXC is then 
computed as the scaled ranking of the root mean squared errors (RMSE) from 
these country-year regressions, and RMSEs are ranked in descending order 
so that higher values of BTAXC indicate higher required book-tax 
conformity. 
TAXRATE = Country statutory tax rate. 
TAXCOMP = Cost of tax compliance as reported in the Freedom of the World 2016 Annual 
Report. 
VARCOMP = The sum of the value of option compensation and restricted stock 
compensation divided by total compensation at the country level, to proxy 
for CEO incentives. Data is from Bryan et al. (2010). 
EARNVOL = The scaled descending rank, between zero and one, of cross-sectional pre-
tax earnings volatility by country-year, following Atwood et al. (2012). Pre-
tax earnings are defined as pre-tax income before exceptional items, divided 
by lagged total assets. 
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FDI = The net outflows of foreign direct investment from the reporting economy to 
the rest of the world, divided by GDP.  
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS  
GDPGR = The growth rate in GDP. Source: 
www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/...Data  
TREND = Time trend variable, defined as the current fiscal year minus the first fiscal 
year in our sample (1995). 
PROA = Pre-tax return on assets. 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
R&D = Research and development expenditures divided by total assets. 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
GROWTH = One-year percentage change in sales. 
BIGN = Indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor and 
zero otherwise. 
WC = Change in current operating assets minus current operating liabilities, 
divided by total assets. 
NCO = Change in noncurrent operating assets minus noncurrent operating liabilities, 
divided by total assets. 
FIN = Change in financial assets minus financial liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
ETHNIC = Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index that measures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals within a country belong to the same ethnic 
group. It is an index between 0 and 1, with higher values denoting higher 
fractionalization. Data from Mauro (1995). 
TRUST_GOVT = Country-year average of rescaled response to the following WVS question: 
“Do you have a lot of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence, no confidence at all in the following: Government.” We recode 
the response to these questions to one if a survey participant reports that he 
or she has a lot of confidence or quite a lot of confidence in government and 
zero otherwise. We then calculate the mean of the response of each country-
year. Higher values correspond to higher societal trust. 
MULTI = An indicator variable that equals zero if foreign income taxes is missing or 
zero and one otherwise. 
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Variables used in the Tax Evasion Analysis 
TRUST = Societal trust index, based on responses to the WVS question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?” The two possible answers were 
“Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be too careful.” We recode the 
response to this question to one if a survey participant reports that most 
people can be trusted and zero otherwise. We then calculate the mean of the 
response for each country-year. Higher values correspond to higher societal 
trust. 
EVADE_RATIO = A measure of tax evasion based on responses to the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys: “Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would 
you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax 
purposes?” The tax evasion ratio is equal to 100 minus the answered number, 
and the extent of tax evasion is increasing in this measure. 
REGQUALITY = Quality of regulation which captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. Data from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). 
TAX_RATE = Firm’s tax as reported in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys: “Please tell us 
if Tax Rates are a problem for the operation and growth of your business. If 
an issue poses a problem, please judge its severity as an obstacle on a four-
point scale where: 0 = no obstacle, 1 = minor obstacle, 2 = moderate obstacle, 
3 = major obstacle, 4 = very severe obstacle.” 
TAX_ADMIN = Tax administration difficulty as reported in the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys: “Please tell us if the Tax Administration is a problem for the 
operation and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please 
judge its severity as an obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = no obstacle, 
1 = minor obstacle, 2 = moderate obstacle, 3 = major obstacle, 4 = very 
severe obstacle.” 
AUDIT = An indicator that equals one if financial statements of the firm are reviewed 
by an external auditor and zero otherwise. Data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys. 
FOREIGN = Percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors. Data from the World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
EXPORT = Percentage of sales that are exported directly. Data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys. 
AGE = Log of firm age. Firm age is based on the response in the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys: “In what year did your firm begin operations in this 
country?” Firm age is measured as the year of the survey minus the firm age 
answered. 
EMP = Total number of employees in the firm. Data from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys. 
INF_PMT = Informal payment as a percentage of sales, based on the response in the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys: “We’ve heard that establishments are 
sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to 
‘get things done’ with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, 
services etc. On average, what percent of annual sales value would such 
expenses cost a typical firm like yours?” 
CORRUPT = The extent of local corruption, based on the response in the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys about local corruption: “Please tell us if any of the 
following issues are a problem for the operation and growth of your business. 
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If an issue poses a problem, please judge its severity as an obstacle on a four-
point scale where: 0 = no obstacle; 1 = minor obstacle; 3 = Major obstacle; 
4 = Very severe obstacle”. 
SMALL_CITY = Firm location = 4 or 5 (city of 50,000 to 250,000 and town or location with 
less than 50,000 population). Data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
CAPITAL_CITY = Firm Location = 1 (capital city). Data from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys. 
TAXPMT = Log of the total number of taxes paid by businesses, including electronic 
filing. Data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
GDPGR = The growth rate in GDP. Source: 
 www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/...Data 
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TABLE 1 
Tax Avoidance Analysis: Sample Composition and Mean Characteristics by Country 
Country N TRUST TAXAVOID LEGFACTOR STMCAP WW BTAXC TAXRATE TAXCOMP VARCOMP EARNVOL 
Turkey 1,457 0.05 0.16 -1.02 0.29 1 0.65 0.22 7.50 0.00 0.43 
Peru 654 0.06 0.29 -0.63 0.46 1 0.49 0.30 5.74 0.00 0.53 
Philippines 1,236 0.09 0.28 -0.50 0.55 1 0.33 0.32 7.81 0.00 0.24 
Brazil 2,688 0.09 0.27 -0.76 0.50 1 0.25 0.34 0.00 0.02 0.12 
Chile 1,544 0.12 0.12 0.50 1.02 1 0.75 0.18 6.46 0.00 0.24 
Singapore 5,022 0.15 0.11 0.82 2.14 0 0.45 0.19 9.06 0.13 0.19 
Mexico 1,124 0.16 0.24 -1.57 0.30 1 0.35 0.31 4.20 0.00 0.63 
South Africa 2,240 0.17 0.43 0.21 2.14 1 0.12 0.36 7.76 0.31 0.22 
France 7,080 0.19 0.17 0.07 0.72 0 0.34 0.35 8.52 0.14 0.24 
Spain 1,542 0.20 0.20 -0.12 1.00 1 0.57 0.33 7.61 0.02 0.55 
Italy 2,077 0.29 0.18 -1.43 0.37 0 0.54 0.36 6.26 0.05 0.48 
Korea 5,363 0.30 0.27 -0.22 0.77 1 0.29 0.26 7.20 0.00 0.41 
UK 13,187 0.30 0.18 1.99 1.26 1 0.14 0.30 8.77 0.20 0.07 
Germany 6,927 0.34 0.25 -1.21 0.44 1 0.24 0.38 7.80 0.05 0.19 
Japan 36,631 0.39 -0.01 0.66 0.75 1 0.38 0.43 6.02 0.02 0.61 
USA 45,940 0.40 0.13 2.05 1.20 1 0.05 0.39 7.90 0.40 0.02 
Hong Kong 7,038 0.41 0.18 1.17 8.15 0 0.41 0.17 9.10 0.01 0.13 
Indonesia 2,170 0.43 0.32 -1.10 0.36 1 0.60 0.27 7.02 0.00 0.32 
Netherlands 2,100 0.44 0.17 -0.45 0.97 0 0.35 0.31 8.16 0.25 0.21 
Australia 6,812 0.48 0.28 1.35 1.04 0 0.09 0.31 8.80 0.31 0.06 
Switzerland 2,793 0.51 0.10 -0.81 2.08 0 0.57 0.23 9.29 0.04 0.33 
New Zealand 1,166 0.51 0.27 0.87 0.37 0 0.40 0.31 9.22 0.42 0.16 
Finland 1,345 0.59 0.08 -0.15 1.03 0 0.44 0.27 7.28 0.03 0.42 
Sweden 2,731 0.68 0.15 -0.02 0.98 1 0.26 0.27 8.63 0.09 0.20 
Norway 1,600 0.74 0.18 0.28 0.49 1 0.12 0.28 9.02 0.00 0.23 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Country FDI GDPGR PROA SIZE R&D LEV GROWTH BIGN  ΔWC ΔNCO ΔFIN 
Turkey 0.00 0.04 0.11 5.65 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.05 -0.02 
Peru 0.00 0.06 0.14 5.44 0.00 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.02 
Philippines 0.01 0.05 0.11 5.20 0.00 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.01 
Brazil 0.00 0.03 0.10 6.87 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.72 0.02 0.06 -0.03 
Chile 0.04 0.04 0.09 5.97 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.81 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
Singapore 0.12 0.06 0.09 4.96 0.00 0.19 0.16 0.71 0.02 0.04 -0.02 
Mexico 0.01 0.02 0.10 7.32 0.00 0.21 0.13 0.52 0.01 0.05 -0.02 
South Africa 0.01 0.03 0.15 5.58 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.65 0.02 0.05 -0.01 
France 0.03 0.02 0.08 6.18 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.43 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Spain 0.04 0.02 0.08 7.13 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.87 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
Italy 0.02 0.00 0.07 6.87 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.58 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Korea 0.02 0.04 0.07 6.31 0.01 0.24 0.13 0.46 0.01 0.03 0.00 
UK 0.05 0.02 0.11 5.63 0.01 0.19 0.14 0.70 0.01 0.05 -0.02 
Germany 0.02 0.01 0.09 6.08 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.54 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.06 6.31 0.01 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
USA 0.02 0.03 0.11 6.27 0.03 0.23 0.13 0.85 0.01 0.05 -0.02 
Hong Kong 0.28 0.04 0.10 5.76 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.77 0.02 0.05 -0.01 
Indonesia 0.01 0.06 0.12 5.09 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.05 -0.02 
Netherlands 0.08 0.02 0.10 6.88 0.01 0.23 0.07 0.91 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
Australia 0.01 0.03 0.12 5.11 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.64 0.01 0.06 -0.01 
Switzerland 0.08 0.02 0.08 6.66 0.02 0.21 0.07 0.84 0.00 0.02 0.00 
New Zealand 0.00 0.03 0.11 5.21 0.01 0.25 0.12 0.81 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
Finland 0.04 0.02 0.09 6.16 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sweden 0.06 0.02 0.12 5.47 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.76 0.01 0.05 -0.02 
Norway 0.04 0.02 0.10 6.11 0.01 0.27 0.14 0.87 0.01 0.05 -0.01 
This table provides the sample composition for the tax avoidance analyses and the mean characteristics by country and is sorted from low to high level of TRUST. Detailed definitions 
of the variables are provided in the appendix. All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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TABLE 2 
Tax Avoidance Analysis: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev 
TRUST 0.360 0.391 0.304 0.396 0.115 
TAXAVOID 0.136 0.128 0.005 0.298 0.251 
LEGFACTOR 0.891 0.663 0.065 2.054 1.070 
STMCAP 1.305 0.977 0.670 1.304 1.629 
WW 0.782 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.413 
BTAXC 0.254 0.218 0.064 0.381 0.206 
TAXRATE 0.350 0.384 0.300 0.400 0.083 
TAXCOMP 7.507 7.900 6.020 8.520 1.469 
VARCOMP 0.173 0.132 0.024 0.395 0.163 
EARNVOL 0.249 0.120 0.020 0.510 0.258 
FDI 0.037 0.018 0.010 0.028 0.064 
GDPGR 0.023 0.024 0.016 0.038 0.025 
PROA 0.093 0.070 0.033 0.126 0.115 
SIZE 6.084 5.944 4.742 7.333 1.968 
R&D 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.039 
LEV 0.212 0.189 0.052 0.326 0.189 
GROWTH 0.110 0.062 -0.016 0.169 0.389 
BIGN  0.548 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.498 
ΔWC 0.009 0.006 -0.019 0.036 0.083 
ΔNCO 0.034 0.012 -0.013 0.059 0.129 
ΔFIN -0.009 0.000 -0.046 0.037 0.124 
 
 
  
 42 
 
 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) TRUST 1.00          
(2) TAXAVOID -0.09 1.00         
(3) LEGFACTOR 0.23 -0.07 1.00        
(4) STMCAP 0.08 0.07 0.17 1.00       
(5) WW 0.02 -0.09 0.21 -0.41 1.00      
(6) BTAXC -0.21 -0.07 -0.60 0.05 -0.27 1.00     
(7) TAXRATE 0.16 -0.21 0.19 -0.49 0.52 -0.23 1.00    
(8) TAXCOMP 0.24 0.12 0.34 0.33 -0.41 -0.22 -0.41 1.00   
(9) VARCOMP 0.17 0.08 0.75 -0.07 0.09 -0.71 0.22 0.39 1.00  
(10) EARNVOL -0.04 -0.21 -0.50 -0.19 0.10 0.56 0.20 -0.50 -0.71 1.00 
(11) FDI 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.88 -0.48 0.17 -0.57 0.35 -0.21 -0.14 
(12) GDPGR -0.14 0.09 0.05 0.19 -0.14 -0.04 -0.30 0.17 0.10 -0.27 
(13) PROA 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 0.10 0.14 -0.17 
(14) SIZE 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.12 -0.01 0.07 
(15) R&D 0.09 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 0.07 -0.13 0.09 0.04 0.14 -0.08 
(16) LEV 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 
(17) GROWTH 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.09 
(18) BIGN  0.07 -0.10 0.28 0.16 -0.13 -0.32 -0.23 0.36 0.46 -0.55 
(19) ΔWC 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.04 
(20) ΔNCO 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.11 
(21) ΔFIN 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(11) FDI 1.00           
 (12) GDPGR 0.22 1.00          
(13) PROA 0.03 0.12 1.00         
(14) SIZE -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 1.00        
(15) R&D -0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 1.00       
(16) LEV -0.05 0.01 -0.21 0.24 -0.16 1.00      
(17) GROWTH 0.04 0.13 0.28 -0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00     
(18) BIGN  0.14 0.19 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.08 0.04 1.00    
(19) ΔWC 0.03 0.08 0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.18 -0.01 1.00   
(20) ΔNCO 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.34 0.06 0.06 1.00  
(21) ΔFIN -0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.21 -0.16 -0.04 0.30 0.52 1.00 
This table provides the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations (Panel B) for the main variables used in the tax avoidance analyses. Detailed definitions of the 
variables are provided in the appendix. All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All correlations with absolute values greater than 0.02 are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level or better (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
Relation between Societal Trust, Legal Institutions, Capital Market Pressure, and Tax Avoidance 
 (1) (2) 
TRUST -0.105 -0.129 
 (-10.48)*** (-6.79)*** 
TRUST*LEGFACTOR  0.060 
  (3.04)*** 
TRUST*STMCAP  -0.015 
  (-2.92)*** 
LEGFACTOR -0.073 -0.092 
 (-37.82)*** (-12.87)*** 
STMCAP 0.022 0.013 
 (18.53)*** (1.88)* 
WW -0.033 -0.035 
 (-9.20)*** (-9.39)*** 
BTAXC -0.060 -0.056 
 (-8.65)*** (-8.07)*** 
TAXRATE 0.235 0.236 
 (10.90)*** (10.91)*** 
TAXCOMP 0.010 0.013 
 (10.14)*** (10.73)*** 
VARCOMP 0.255 0.235 
 (15.40)*** (13.72)*** 
EARNVOL -0.171 -0.170 
 (-27.35)*** (-27.47)*** 
FDI -0.004 -0.004 
 (-15.60)*** (-13.49)*** 
GDPGR 0.312 0.305 
 (5.33)*** (5.18)*** 
TREND 0.005 0.005 
 (20.82)*** (20.65)*** 
PROA 0.140 0.139 
 (15.00)*** (14.93)*** 
SIZE -0.006 -0.006 
 (-9.06)*** (-9.14)*** 
R&D -0.096 -0.095 
 (-3.76)*** (-3.75)*** 
LEV 0.052 0.052 
 (8.86)*** (8.85)*** 
GROWTH 0.028 0.028 
 (14.10)*** (14.02)*** 
BIGN -0.011 -0.010 
 (-4.16)*** (-3.92)*** 
ΔWC 0.016 0.016 
 (1.99)** (2.01)** 
ΔNCO 0.112 0.112 
 (18.58)*** (18.50)*** 
ΔFIN 0.080 0.079 
 (13.39)*** (13.35)*** 
Constant 0.192 0.185 
 (10.41)*** (9.46)***    
Observations 162,467 162,467 
Adj. R2 0.198 0.198 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance, measured by TAXAVOID. Column 
1 shows the results with TRUST and both firm-level and country-level institutional controls. Column 2 shows the results of the role 
of legal institutions (LEGFACTOR) and capital market pressure (STMCAP) on the relation between societal trust (TRUST) and tax 
avoidance, measured by TAXAVOID. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. Coefficients on the year 
and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Relation between Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance – Additional Cross-sectional Analyses 
  (1) (2) 
 VAR=TRUST_GOVT VAR=MULTI 
TRUST -0.142 -0.062 
 (-9.98)*** (-4.82)*** 
TRUST*VAR -0.611 0.061 
 (-3.87)*** (1.93)* 
VAR -0.071 -0.038 
 (-2.45)** (-11.81)*** 
LEGFACTOR -0.065 -0.057 
 (-32.69)*** (-25.35)*** 
STMCAP 0.014 0.003 
 (9.91)*** (1.82)* 
WW -0.013 -0.031 
 (-3.27)*** (-6.92)*** 
BTAXC -0.046 -0.068 
 (-6.52)*** (-7.97)*** 
TAXRATE 0.264 0.108 
 (10.28)*** (3.77)*** 
TAXCOMP 0.011 0.021 
 (10.38)*** (13.79)*** 
VARCOMP 0.248 0.299 
 (14.20)*** (14.90)*** 
EARNVOL -0.158 -0.186 
 (-24.37)*** (-20.55)*** 
FDI -0.003 -0.002 
 (-9.04)*** (-6.74)*** 
GDPGR 0.778 0.981 
 (11.95)*** (10.98)*** 
TREND 0.005 0.015 
 (23.37)*** (37.98)*** 
PROA 0.127 0.168 
 (13.83)*** (10.74)*** 
SIZE -0.006 -0.001 
 (-10.32)*** (-1.57) 
R&D -0.093 -0.144 
 (-3.68)*** (-3.53)*** 
LEV 0.053 0.057 
 (8.88)*** (7.13)*** 
GROWTH 0.029 0.036 
 (13.89)*** (13.87)*** 
BIGN -0.007 -0.004 
 (-2.53)** (-1.12) 
ΔWC 0.020 0.002 
 (2.52)** (0.23) 
ΔNCO 0.114 0.106 
 (18.68)*** (13.32)*** 
ΔFIN 0.084 0.087 
 (14.02)*** (10.92)*** 
Constant 0.157 -0.195 
 (7.85)*** (-7.75)*** 
Observations 157,445 81,412 
Adj. R2 0.206 0.200 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between societal trust (TRUST) and tax avoidance measured by TAXAVOID, 
conditional on various moderating variables. Column 1 reports the results using trust in the government (TRUST_GOVT) as the 
moderating variable, and Column 2 reports the results using the presence of multinational operations (MULTI) as the moderating 
variable. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables 
are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for 
cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Relation between Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance – Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
First-stage 
Dependent variable:  
TRUST 
Second-stage 
Dependent variable:  
TAXAVOID 
Second-stage 
Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID 
PRED_TRUST  -0.194 -0.657 
  (-14.41)*** (-14.81)*** 
PRED_TRUST*LEGFACTOR   0.247 
   (7.14)*** 
PRED_TRUST*STMCAP   -0.314 
   (-18.04)*** 
ENTHIC -0.300   
 (-33.50)***   
LEGFACTOR -0.024 -0.067 -0.026 
 (-17.51)*** (-39.38)*** (-2.11)** 
STMCAP 0.022 0.020 0.109 
 (34.71)*** (17.10)*** (15.22)*** 
WW -0.044 -0.032 -0.029 
 (-10.49)*** (-8.83)*** (-7.73)*** 
BTAXC -0.028 -0.070 -0.076 
 (-4.50)*** (-9.98)*** (-10.58)*** 
TAXRATE -0.140 0.229 0.252 
 (-7.90)*** (10.62)*** (11.03)*** 
TAXCOMP 0.034 0.013 0.017 
 (45.62)*** (12.96)*** (12.13)*** 
VARCOMP 0.384 0.246 0.325 
 (31.12)*** (15.43)*** (15.09)*** 
EARNVOL 0.132 -0.168 -0.138 
 (38.58)*** (-26.58)*** (-17.62)*** 
FDI -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-2.10)** (-14.46)*** (-14.03)*** 
GDPGR -0.364 0.238 0.308 
 (-11.07)*** (3.97)*** (4.92)*** 
TREND -0.001 0.005 0.006 
 (-10.69)*** (20.16)*** (2.47)** 
PROA 0.002 0.140 0.138 
 (0.41) (14.93)*** (14.95)*** 
SIZE -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-3.62)*** (-9.33)*** (-9.99)*** 
R&D 0.080 -0.088 -0.055 
 (4.37)*** (-3.49)*** (-2.07)** 
LEV 0.017 0.053 0.057 
 (5.02)*** (8.97)*** (9.74)*** 
GROWTH 0.001 0.029 0.028 
 (1.00) (14.12)*** (13.94)*** 
BIGN 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.98) (-3.66)*** (-2.88)*** 
ΔWC 0.018 0.017 0.022 
 (5.20)*** (2.11)** (2.82)*** 
ΔNCO 0.014 0.113 0.117 
 (4.86)*** (18.70)*** (19.24)*** 
ΔFIN 0.018 0.080 0.085 
 (6.64)*** (13.51)*** (14.13)*** 
Constant 0.011   
 (0.87)   
    
Observations 162,467 162,467 162,467 
Adj. R2 0.313 0.130 0.199 
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This table reports the regression results of the relation between societal trust (TRUST) and tax avoidance measured by TAXAVOID, 
using instrumental variable (2SLS) estimation. In Column 1, we report the results of the first-stage regression, where we regress 
TRUST on an instrument, ETHNIC, and other control variables in the main regression. In Column 2, we report the second-stage 
results using the predicted value of TRUST (PRED_TRUST) from the first-stage. In Column 3, we report the second-stage results 
of the role of legal institutions (LEGFACTOR) and capital market pressure (STMCAP) on the relation between societal trust 
(TRUST), using the predicted value of TRUST (PRED_TRUST) from the first-stage and tax avoidance measured by TAXAVOID. 
Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not 
tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-
sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Relation between Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance - Alternative Measures for Tax Avoidance 
 
Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID_ALT1 
Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID_ALT2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TRUST -0.099 -0.110 -1.645 -2.125 
 (-10.05)*** (-5.84)*** (-26.84)*** (-17.78)*** 
TRUST*LEGFACTOR  0.069  0.296 
  (3.51)***  (2.61)*** 
TRUST*STMCAP  -0.001  -0.475 
  (-0.05)  (-4.69)*** 
LEGFACTOR -0.072 -0.094 -0.666 -0.561 
 (-37.55)*** (-13.33)*** (-60.14)*** (-14.21)*** 
STMCAP 0.022 0.019 0.204 0.012 
 (18.67)*** (2.75)*** (22.90)*** (0.29) 
WW -0.032 -0.033 -0.058 -0.051 
 (-8.95)*** (-9.23)*** (-2.83)*** (-2.47)** 
BTAXC -0.054 -0.050 -0.421 -0.454 
 (-7.91)*** (-7.27)*** (-8.32)*** (-8.81)*** 
TAXRATE 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (9.38)*** (9.45)*** (1.99)** (2.04)** 
TAXCOMP 0.011 0.014 0.055 0.055 
 (11.52)*** (12.00)*** (9.47)*** (8.51)*** 
VARCOMP 0.242 0.220 2.573 2.720 
 (14.77)*** (12.95)*** (24.63)*** (23.92)*** 
EARNVOL -0.172 -0.172 -1.449 -1.396 
 (-27.86)*** (-28.20)*** (-30.57)*** (-28.61)*** 
FDI -0.004 -0.004 -0.031 -0.030 
 (-15.51)*** (-13.40)*** (-11.74)*** (-11.32)*** 
GDPGR 0.294 0.269 0.947 0.304 
 (5.07)*** (4.62)*** (2.25)** (0.68) 
TREND 0.001 0.001 0.052 0.053 
 (2.87)*** (2.95)*** (17.69)*** (18.02)*** 
PROA 0.133 0.133 0.059 0.058 
 (14.70)*** (14.65)*** (1.03) (1.00) 
SIZE -0.005 -0.005 -0.157 -0.158 
 (-8.02)*** (-8.04)*** (-38.87)*** (-39.12)*** 
R&D -0.101 -0.099 -0.299 -0.347 
 (-3.96)*** (-3.90)*** (-1.54) (-1.79)* 
LEV 0.053 0.053 0.999 0.998 
 (9.06)*** (9.05)*** (25.80)*** (25.76)*** 
GROWTH 0.028 0.028 0.236 0.236 
 (13.83)*** (13.76)*** (14.23)*** (14.24)*** 
BIGN -0.010 -0.009 -0.027 -0.025 
 (-3.65)*** (-3.42)*** (-1.56) (-1.43) 
ΔWC 0.011 0.011 0.048 0.053 
 (1.41) (1.40) (0.57) (0.64) 
ΔNCO 0.108 0.107 0.885 0.886 
 (17.98)*** (17.87)*** (14.33)*** (14.36)*** 
ΔFIN 0.079 0.078 0.821 0.821 
 (13.30)*** (13.24)*** (12.45)*** (12.47)*** 
Constant 0.038 0.025 -0.919 -0.752 
 (2.08)** (1.31) (-7.28)*** (-5.68)***      
     
Observations 162,467 162,467 162,467 162,467 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.124 0.124 0.129 0.129 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between societal trust and alternative measures of tax avoidance. Columns 
1 and 2 show the results using an industry-year mean-adjusted measure of tax avoidance, computed as the firm’s TAXAVOID minus 
the firm’s industry-year mean TAXAVOID. The extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
results using an indicator variable that equals one if the tax avoidance is within the top quartile of the sample distribution and zero 
otherwise, to capture the extent of tax avoidance. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. Coefficients 
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on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Tax Evasion Analysis: Sample Composition and Mean Characteristics by Country 
Country N TRUST EVADE_RATIO REGQUALITY TAX_RATE TAX_ADMIN AUDIT FOREIGN EXPORT 
Turkey 1,631 0.05 36.47 0.27 2.60 2.18 0.51 5.26 77.19 
Rwanda 207 0.05 19.19 -0.50 0.30 0.04 0.39 14.29 97.27 
Peru 470 0.06 9.05 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.32 8.12 85.71 
Uganda 588 0.08 42.84 -0.21 0.47 0.36 0.48 15.42 94.28 
Tanzania 561 0.08 42.34 -0.50 0.83 0.71 0.59 10.29 95.27 
Philippines 517 0.09 22.10 -0.06 1.59 1.41 0.75 19.63 69.29 
Algeria 79 0.11 32.53 -0.79 2.14 1.99 0.68 0.00 99.91 
Zambia 121 0.12 16.07 -0.45 2.25 1.46 0.82 22.75 82.52 
Chile 1,574 0.12 7.55 1.53 0.69 0.47 0.53 9.02 88.06 
Colombia 670 0.14 17.34 0.27 0.11 0.04 0.54 1.97 93.01 
El Salvador 643 0.15 22.03 0.22 0.69 0.42 0.85 6.66 81.95 
Burkina Faso 74 0.15 28.18 -0.17 0.20 0.04 0.35 6.51 94.34 
Mexico 834 0.16 23.12 0.34 0.13 0.03 0.30 6.82 93.41 
Guatemala 675 0.16 23.74 -0.15 1.30 0.95 0.42 7.95 86.42 
Bosnia  286 0.16 19.49 -0.16 1.51 1.35 0.45 12.73 89.19 
Kyrgyz Rep. 381 0.17 20.80 -0.34 1.77 1.86 0.41 9.30 90.65 
Argentina 519 0.17 16.65 -0.74 0.14 0.05 0.69 12.93 86.55 
South Africa 518 0.17 8.72 0.50 1.34 0.88 0.96 15.96 85.99 
Mali 113 0.17 25.59 -0.39 2.15 1.81 0.48 12.82 92.53 
Moldova 489 0.18 16.31 -0.17 2.19 1.95 0.25 10.06 82.28 
Slovenia 338 0.18 12.24 0.83 1.17 1.03 0.38 10.49 78.53 
Georgia 284 0.18 24.89 0.49 1.82 1.60 0.72 11.12 90.39 
Egypt 877 0.18 17.12 -0.17 3.26 2.59 0.83 2.47 91.18 
Poland 1,355 0.19 9.92 0.82 2.31 1.93 0.42 7.60 91.04 
Spain 569 0.20 3.75 1.24 1.21 0.94 0.59 5.56 94.03 
Azerbaijan 426 0.21 13.13 -0.35 1.53 1.53 0.50 11.70 94.20 
Estonia 238 0.22 4.71 1.43 0.82 0.61 0.87 14.29 86.68 
Lithuania 288 0.22 13.36 1.12 2.05 1.38 0.52 11.48 85.85 
Bulgaria 442 0.22 15.68 0.69 1.55 1.05 0.45 10.60 87.50 
Hungary 596 0.23 10.42 1.19 2.06 1.28 0.69 12.87 85.50 
Belarus 438 0.24 7.67 -1.25 1.67 1.41 0.54 11.56 87.86 
Albania 307 0.24 23.19 0.15 2.14 1.74 0.81 9.69 84.38 
Armenia 476 0.25 6.30 0.31 1.81 1.99 0.40 7.83 89.62 
Latvia 283 0.25 9.50 1.03 1.80 1.80 0.59 12.44 89.66 
Croatia 315 0.25 9.26 0.51 1.44 0.67 0.46 12.82 86.04 
Dominican Rep. 85 0.26 37.84 -0.19 2.51 1.73 0.89 2.94 97.24 
Russia 843 0.27 17.31 -0.39 1.53 1.67 0.39 8.28 94.64 
Slovak Rep. 226 0.27 9.32 1.12 1.30 1.03 0.49 11.48 87.81 
Ukraine 781 0.28 12.81 -0.52 1.97 1.48 0.45 10.90 91.64 
Uruguay 77 0.28 12.12 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.23 8.38 85.55 
Czech Rep. 488 0.29 12.15 1.15 2.09 1.94 0.40 10.06 90.13 
Korea 546 0.30 9.83 0.73 1.04 0.82 0.36 8.57 91.60 
Jordan 330 0.31 14.40 0.33 0.10 0.12 0.77 10.15 78.60 
Germany 1,181 0.34 5.72 1.49 1.66 1.46 0.54 6.40 94.75 
Indonesia 709 0.43 26.86 -0.32 1.61 1.42 0.46 14.06 70.72 
Vietnam 592 0.52 5.12 -0.60 0.90 0.72 0.29 9.16 67.34 
China 577 0.52 56.14 -0.13 1.66 1.38 0.64 12.85 86.45 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Country AGE EMP INF_PMT CORRUPT SMALL_CITY CAPITAL_CITY TAXPMT GDPGR 
Turkey 2.53 3.71 0.77 1.92 0.17 0.32 2.40 7.87 
Rwanda 1.89 2.60 2.80 0.01 0.09 0.91 3.22 9.24 
Peru 2.65 3.31 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.00 2.20 7.53 
Uganda 2.23 2.68 3.52 0.37 0.16 0.66 3.47 10.04 
Tanzania 2.29 2.86 2.75 0.69 0.13 0.60 3.85 5.27 
Philippines 2.72 4.05 2.12 1.70 0.36 0.00 3.87 4.97 
Algeria 2.32 2.91 6.97 1.97 0.00 0.00 3.66 5.60 
Zambia 2.52 4.24 1.68 1.95 0.18 0.55 3.64 4.51 
Chile 2.94 3.70 0.55 0.38 0.14 0.29 2.08 5.25 
Colombia 2.48 3.03 1.72 0.06 0.00 0.00 4.25 6.70 
El Salvador 2.71 3.41 1.88 0.86 0.06 0.21 3.97 3.09 
Burkina Faso 2.30 2.32 6.15 0.07 0.00 0.46 3.81 6.25 
Mexico 2.64 3.31 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 3.30 5.00 
Guatemala 2.72 3.40 2.69 1.78 0.13 0.37 3.64 3.85 
Bosnia 2.42 3.11 0.66 1.51 0.62 0.38 4.01 5.12 
Kyrgyz Rep. 2.33 3.38 2.84 1.67 0.61 0.33 4.33 1.44 
Argentina 2.97 3.63 1.42 0.03 0.00 0.00 4.13 8.40 
South Africa 2.79 4.69 0.32 1.13 0.03 0.00 2.48 2.95 
Mali 2.26 2.67 3.30 2.26 0.07 0.93 4.08 7.44 
Moldova 2.16 3.41 1.52 1.59 0.53 0.47 3.97 7.46 
Slovenia 2.68 2.88 0.53 0.63 0.78 0.22 3.09 3.93 
Georgia 2.31 2.90 1.71 1.54 0.49 0.51 3.83 7.36 
Egypt 2.75 3.50 2.65 2.24 0.05 0.29 3.74 4.09 
Poland 2.54 2.71 0.87 1.33 0.44 0.12 3.69 2.94 
Spain 2.65 2.63 0.06 0.40 0.59 0.15 1.95 3.72 
Azerbaijan 2.12 3.46 2.74 1.28 0.15 0.69 3.61 22.17 
Estonia 2.27 3.07 0.36 0.68 0.39 0.61 1.95 8.01 
Lithuania 2.33 3.16 0.94 1.20 0.51 0.31 2.40 7.31 
Bulgaria 2.53 2.91 1.85 1.25 0.62 0.19 3.37 5.33 
Hungary 2.41 2.98 0.89 0.76 0.63 0.36 2.56 4.33 
Belarus 2.26 3.26 1.30 0.82 0.40 0.34 4.83 7.32 
Albania 2.07 3.04 2.49 1.96 0.62 0.35 3.81 4.45 
Armenia 2.38 2.94 1.18 1.15 0.44 0.56 3.91 13.67 
Latvia 2.15 2.72 0.81 0.84 0.49 0.51 3.37 8.80 
Croatia 2.68 3.13 0.83 1.32 0.68 0.32 3.69 4.58 
Dominican Rep. 2.95 3.63 2.12 2.99 0.00 0.52 4.32 9.26 
Russia 2.19 3.40 1.24 1.07 0.29 0.25 2.48 5.68 
Slovak Rep. 2.35 2.96 1.25 1.15 0.58 0.42 3.47 5.67 
Ukraine 2.25 3.18 1.88 1.38 0.35 0.16 4.99 3.83 
Uruguay 2.97 3.15 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.00 4.01 4.10 
Czech Rep. 2.29 2.82 0.75 1.28 0.69 0.19 3.30 4.53 
Korea 2.32 2.70 0.06 0.61 0.26 0.31 2.64 3.92 
Jordan 2.30 3.64 0.64 0.08 0.00 0.00 3.26 8.09 
Germany 2.76 2.68 0.40 0.41 0.73 0.07 2.48 0.71 
Indonesia 2.70 5.03 1.73 1.86 0.00 0.00 3.93 4.78 
Vietnam 2.06 4.75 0.74 0.79 0.20 0.13 3.47 7.55 
China 2.36 4.79 1.92 1.55 0.00 0.05 3.56 9.09 
This table provides the sample composition for the tax evasion analyses and the mean characteristics by country, sorted in ascending 
order of the level of TRUST. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
 52 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Relation between Societal Trust and Tax Evasion 
  (1) (2) 
TRUST -8.735 -8.900 
 (-3.64)*** (-3.72)*** 
TRUST* REGQUALITY  17.039 
  (7.23)*** 
REGQUALITY -6.247 -10.113 
 (-18.26)*** (-14.68)*** 
TAX_RATE 0.779 0.728 
 (3.83)*** (3.57)*** 
TAX_ADMIN 0.701 0.610 
 (3.46)*** (3.00)*** 
AUDIT -1.386 -1.681 
 (-3.69)*** (-4.44)*** 
FOREIGN -0.045 -0.047 
 (-6.74)*** (-6.97)*** 
EXPORT 0.016 0.014 
 (2.09)** (1.79)* 
AGE -0.790 -0.846 
 (-3.42)*** (-3.65)*** 
EMP -0.778 -0.678 
 (-6.05)*** (-5.24)*** 
INF_PMT 0.652 0.645 
 (11.30)*** (11.18)*** 
CORRUPT 1.656 1.710 
 (9.49)*** (9.79)*** 
SMALL_CITY -1.014 -1.511 
 (-2.26)** (-3.37)*** 
CAPITAL_CITY 2.521 2.071 
 (5.05)*** (4.13)*** 
TAXPMT -3.195 -3.423 
 (-11.03)*** (-11.77)*** 
GDPGR 0.193 0.249 
 (3.87)*** (4.84)*** 
Constant 36.043 37.525 
 (19.43)*** (20.01)***    
Observations 24,617 24,617 
Adj. R2 0.112 0.113 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between societal trust and tax evasion, measured by EVADE_RATIO. 
Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not 
tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors controlling for heteroscedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
